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Process of Believing as Fundamental Brain Function: the 
Concept of Credition 
Glaubensprozesse als fundamentale Hirnfunktion: das 
Creditionen-Konzept 
Hans-Ferdinand Angel  &  Rüdiger J. Seitz 
Abstract 
Despite the long scientific discourse in Western theology and philosophy on religion, spirituality and 
faith, definitions of what a belief is are still virtually lacking. As events and objects in the complex out- 
side world are transformed into probabilistic estimates with personal attributes of meaning and value 
by involvement of the prefrontal cortex, we argue that these probabilistic estimates represent per- 
sonal beliefs. We present a model for the processes of believing - termed creditions - that is suited to 
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Kurzzusammenfassung 
Trotz eines langen Diskurses in Theologie, (Religions-)Philosophie und auch (Neuro-)-Psychologie feh- 
len allgemein anerkannte und konsensfähige Definitionen, die das gesamte Spektrum des Glaubens- 
begriffes abdecken. Da Ereignisse und Objekte in der komplexen Welt unter Beteiligung des Präfron- 
talkortex als probabilistische Repräsentationen mit persönlicher Bedeutung und Bewertung abgebildet 
werden, schlagen wir vor, dass diese probabilistischen Repräsentationen persönliche Glaubensinhalte 
darstellen. Unser Modell der Glaubensprozesse  ̶  sogenannter Creditionen  ̶  ist geeignet, die Kompo- 
nenten und mentalen Vorgänge der säkularen und nicht-säkularen Glaubensbildung zu beschreiben. 
 
Schlüsselwörter 
Glaubenssysteme, Kognition, Emotion, Bewertung, Credition, Religion, religiöse Erfahrung, präfronta- 
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In the European history of philosophy of mind 
one can detect different approaches attempting 
to understand the human mental activity under- 
lying what is called “belief”. It is impossible to 
retrace all variants of this development but they 
exert until today a strong influence on the West- 
ern concepts to understanding “belief”. Some 
predominant directions shall be named here: 
 Concepts of “belief” are vividly discussed in 
Christian theology (Smith 1987, Barth 1957, 
Rahner 2004, Schulz 2001). In the German 
speaking discussion a position which inter- 
pretes theology even as “Glaubenswissen- 
schaft” [“knowledge of belief”] has been pro- 
moted (Seckler 1988). 
 This fact may influence the implicit but nev- 
ertheless widespread idea that all kinds of 
belief are tightly associated with religion. 
Moreover, in anthropology “religion” often is 
understood as by-product of evolution 
(Boyer 2003) which may lead to the idea that 
“belief” due to its relation to religion is also 
an evolutionary by-product. To emphasize 
the non-religious character of convictions 
the term “belief system” is being used. 
 Since the great Greek philosophers Plato and 
Aristotle raised the question of the epistemic 
status of “belief” the question of how belief 
is related to knowledge and rationality is one 
of the main topics in Western philosophy 
(Plantinga & Wolterstorff 1983, Swinburne 
1983, Helm 1999, Dirscherl & Dohmen 2008). 
 In psychology religious phenomena, and es- 
pecially religious beliefs, seem to be under- 
stood as result of deviant developments and 
subordinated under pathological labels, such 
as neuroticism (Hills et al 2004). 
 
 In neuropsychiatry the issue of trying to un- 
derstand what a belief is (especially in its re- 
ligious variants) has been discussed within 
the frameworks of abnormal mental states 
as well as brain lesions. For example, delu- 
sions have been defined as false beliefs 
which obviously pertain to a different reality 
(Coltheart 2007, Devinsky 2009, Coltheart 
2010, Langdon & Coltheart 2000, Connors & 
Halligan 2015). A number of clinico-patho- 
logical reports described religious experi- 
ence in relation to epilepsy and stroke affect- 
ing the (right) temporal lobe, thereby, sup- 
porting the notion that religious experience 
results from brain pathology (Johnstone et 
al. 2009). 
 In psychology of religion one can observe an 
increasing interest in the role of belief and 
unbelief for religious and atheist orientations 
(Scobie 1994, Schnell & Keenan 2013) and 
the relation of religion to spirituality and 
health (Pargament 1997, Koenig & Cohen 
2002, Kohls 2007). This brings into discussion 
the relation of “belief” and distress as well as 
“belief” and placebo effects (Meissner et al. 
2011). 
 Cognitive neuroscience implicitly brought up 
the notion that belief is a component of nor- 
mal mental activity when attempting to ex- 
plore the neural correlates of religious expe- 
rience (Saver & Rabin 1999, Azari et al. 2001). 
 Similar research was interested to under- 
stand spirituality in a more holistic manner 
(Newberg et al. 2001). Unfortunately, some 
of these findings were interpreted in a mis- 
leading way pretending to explain religious 
phenomena as theological matters which 
prompted the notion of “neurotheology” 
(D`Aquili & Newberg 1999, Newberg et al 
2001, Joseph 2002). Not unexpectedly, these 
interpretations provoked heavy reactions 








and strict contradictions from the theological 
and philosophical perspectives (Linke 2003, 
Neuner 2003, Geyer 2004). 
This short overview shows that “belief” seems 
to be an ill-defined phenomenon with quite dif- 
ferent considerations in the different disciplines 
of the sciences and humanities. Furthermore, it 
becomes evident that there is a notable lack of 
a coherent understanding of what believing 
means. 
Currently, the scientific situation suffers from 
two different issues: 
 First, there is a tremendous lack of empirical 
effort to understand belief, which some- 
times even is addressed as “neglect of belief” 
(Connors & Halligan 2015). 
 Second, there seems to be a virtually com- 
plete absence of theoretical attempts to un- 
derstand and to conceptualize “normal” be- 
lief. 
In an attempt to address this deplorable situa- 
tion we first have to realize that most concepts 
treat “belief” as a noun. This, however, neglects 
the procedural aspect of “believing” as a human 
ability, in general, and as a potential mental act 
of an individual. Nevertheless, an increasing in- 
terest in understanding the poorly understood 
and neglected human ability “belief” can be ob- 
served in the contemporary public as well as in 
scientific discourse. Departing from the exten- 
sive debates on the role of faith, belief, tran- 
scendence and spirituality, recently an interdis- 
ciplinary research initiative has begun to charac- 
terize the features of the psychophysical pro- 
cesses underlying believing. In this contribution 
we present the concept of credition which was 
the topic of a recent series of international, in- 
terdisciplinary symposia (http://credition.uni- 
graz.at/de/credition-basic-research/). Out of 
these symposia the hypothesis was developed 
that human beliefs are based on distinct psycho- 
 
physiological processes that are implemented in 
the human brain. These processes of believing 
have been termed creditions which is a neolo- 
gism to indicate their mental properties simi- 
larly to but separate from cognition and emo- 
tion (Angel 2013a). The notion of credition em- 
phasizes the procedural aspect of belief as “pro- 
cess of believing” similarly to other psychologi- 
cal processes. In this contribution we will ex- 
plain that the process of believing is different 
from religion and discuss neuropsychological 
concepts that are suited to provide an empirical 
psychophysical basis for the processes of believ- 
ing. 
 
2. Bridging the gap 
At present two different starting points for over- 
coming the theoretical lack of what believing 
means can be identified. First, cognitive neuro- 
science and related disciplines show a new 
openness for understanding “religious phenom- 
ena” including “believing” as human abilities 
and activities that can be approached empiri- 
cally (Connors & Halligan 2015). Second, at- 
tempts have been made to formulate a theoret- 
ical frame for “normal” believing which neither 
reflects a pathological brain state nor is strictly 
bound to religions. 
Both approaches are instrumental to develop an 
innovative concept of normal human believing 
and to understand brain functions underlying 
believing. Of course, at the current state these 
initial attempts demand interdisciplinary re- 
search to work out the theoretical implications 
of both approaches as well as the implicit as- 
sumptions inherent in this bridging endeavour 
(Runehov 2007). 








2.1 Empirical attempts open for religious 
experiences 
When talking about “believing” we understand 
that our topic refers to the psychological pro- 
cess that is brought about by the human brain. 
However, when it comes to the noun “belief”, 
there is no acceptable definition what this actu- 
ally is and what, in comparison, a tentative tax- 
onomy of a false belief or delusion is (Bell & Hal- 
ligan 2012). Due to a long history of Western 
thinking beliefs are often understood as closely 
related to religion. That may mislead to an un- 
derstanding of believing solely as a religion-re- 
lated process, although in the last decades so- 
cial science stressed the comprehensive role of 
belief systems which may include religions. Fol- 
lowing William James (James 1885, 1902), the 
matter of religion typically has been described 
as “religious experience”. However, the adjec- 
tive “religious” is an adjective which can be re- 
lated to two different nouns. Without empirical 
evidence the most widespread association is the 
noun “religion”. The other nouns which are re- 
lated to “religious” are “religiosity” or “religious- 
ness”. Theoretically, “religious experience” en- 
compasses three dimensions: (a) religion, (b) re- 
ligiosity, and (c) the (individual or collective) re- 
lation between religion and religiosity (Angel 
2013b, Seitz & Angel 2014). Typically, “belief” is 
conceived to be predominantly related to “reli- 
gion”. For the individual person a tripartite 
model of religion has been proposed which 
comprises the elements myth (cognition), ritual 
(perception and action), and experience of tran- 
scendence (emotion) (Schnell 2003). Accord- 
ingly, religion is a broad term encompassing be- 
yond the transcendental faith of individuals in 
supernatural deities or a God also the manda- 
tory ritual behaviour of worship and contempla- 
tion, as well as the identity providing belief in a 
myth about the community or society. In con- 
trast, “religiosity” has been considered to reflect 
the belief of individuals. For this very reason,  it 
 
was considered as irrelevant for the exploration 
by the natural sciences (Stich 1996). Recently, 
however, it has been argued that there is an 
“implicit religiosity” (Schnell 2012). Implicit re- 
ligiosity suggests the theoretical existence of a 
non-religious or non-religion-related religiosity 
which most likely corresponds to a secular belief 
system. Furthermore, religiosity or religious- 
ness, were hypothesized to employ two differ- 
ent types of cognitive processing: an implicit/in- 
tuitive and an abstract/rational mode (Watts 
2007). Such a view concurs with the notion and 
the accumulating empirical evidence that reli- 
gion can be conceptualized as a by-product or 
process of normal human cognition (Boyer 
2003, Kapogiannis et al. 2009). 
First evidence that religious experience has a 
neurophysiological representation in the human 
brain was provided by Azari and collaborators 
(2001). These authors performed a functional 
imaging experiment in which they asked self- 
identified Christian subjects to recite Psalm 23. 
In a categorical comparison to resting wakeful- 
ness significant activation of a frontal-parietal 
circuit was found (Figure 1). Specifically, the ac- 
tivations involved the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, the dorsomedial frontal cortex including 
the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), 
and the medial parietal cortex. Moreover, a 
multivariate network analysis revealed the dif- 
ferential engagement of neural networks partic- 
ipating in cognition as well as in emotion (Azari 
et al. 2005). These findings were substantiated 
by similar observations related to self-referen- 
tial processing in religious Christians as com- 
pared to Chinese non-religious people (Han et 
al. 2008). 
A large number of imaging studies indicate that 
these brain areas play a profound role in sus- 
taining on-line reflexive evaluation of thought 
(Niendam et al. 2012). Therefore, these findings 
provided neuro-scientific support for the notion 








that religious beliefs involve both cognitive 
thoughts and emotional loadings. Thus, it was 
 
suggested that what makes an experience dis- 





     
 
Figure 1: Activations during recital of psalm 23 in a group of Christian volunteers. Note the activation 
of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, pre-SMA, and precuneus (white areas all images) and anterior 
prefrontal cortex and superior cerebellum (black areas in right image). Shown are a lateral (left), dorsal 





2.2 Theoretical foundation of “normal” be- 
lieving: the Model of Credition 
We propose that to describe normal believing 
processes there is a need for a process-theoret- 
ical foundation (Angel 2015b). Furthermore, we 
propose that normal believing is inextricably in- 
terrelated with cognition and emotion (Angel 
2015a). 
The process character of believing includes a 
number of different mental operations that are 
heavily involved in the perception of events or 
objects in the outer world and in control of be- 
havior. The believing process, or credition, ac- 
commodates at least three different aspects: 
[1] the believing process consists of a bundle of 
four conceptually successive, but nevertheless 
in reality heavily interwoven mental functions, 
[2] the believing process operates on basic units 
which are called “bab”, 
[3] for a “bab” four characteristics can be 
named. 
 
2.2.1 Mental functions in the believing 
process 
Credition has been conceived as a psychological 
term denoting the mental activity related to 
what we call “he/she believes” encompassing 
both religious and secular processes of believ- 
ing. Figure 2 depicts the key functions that have 
been hypothesized to constitute the formation 
of creditions. Central to the model is the so- 
called enclosure function which denotes the 
self-organizing probabilistic assembly of mental 
attributes of a given object or event a subject is 
encountering into a coherent mental construct. 
Note, that the coherent knowledge   constructs 








comprehend formal descriptions of the per- 
ceived encounters that can be expressed in 
terms of objective metrics as well as personal 
values associated with them. The personal val- 
ues reflect the meaning and relevance the ob- 
ject or event has for the given individual (Seitz & 
Angel 2014). Importantly, people employ these 
mental constructs for selecting an action which 
appears most appropriate for the subject in a 
given situation. We will see later that the deci- 
sion to select a certain action involves action 
planning as well as prediction of the possible re- 
ward as well as the costs of arriving at a    given 
 
goal. In other word, perception is converted by 
the so-called converter function into an in- 
tended action which is part of and directed 
within an entire space of action. This cybernetic 
model of credition assumes that the mental op- 
erations are mediated by a presumed operator 
in the human brain and can be stabilized by rep- 
etitions similarly to a learning process. Atti- 
tudes, hormonal states, pharmaceutical agents 
and physical threatening that act on the entire 
individual can severely influence or modulate 





Figure 2: The credition model describing the process of believing. The Enclosure function (E) defines 
the representation of the stimulus and the Converter function (C) provides the appropriate action in 
response to the stimulus. Creditions are modulated by the internal state of the individual (© HF Angel; 
conference presentation 2012, for the first time published here). 







2.2.2 Bab as basic unit of the believing 
process 
It has to be stated explicitly that the theoretical 
model of creditions emphasizes the process 
character of believing and by this the fluidity of 
beliefs. However, the theoretical status of the 
model and its theoretical foundation still cannot 
be explained in total. Therefore, some of the as- 
pects which are referred to in the following pas- 
sages may remain partly vague. Specifically, one 
of the most crucial questions is how to define 
the basic unit of the believing process. It is im- 
portant that such a unit accommodates two 
basic claims: 
First, it has to provide a theoretical frame which 
accounts for the fluidity of the believing process 
and which allows to integrate different scientific 
descriptions (physical, biological, neural, behav- 
ioural, and so on). Second, it has to provide the 
possibility to integrate cognitive and emotional 
processes under a common label. For such a 
new umbrella-term we propose as basic unit the 
term “bab”. The name “bab” was derived from 
the well-known Russian toy “Babushka” which 
in some regions might be known as “Matry- 
oshka” to indicate the similarity and compre- 
hensiveness of their components. 
Having declared “bab” as basic unit we can de- 
scribe different characteristics which we assign 
to a single “bab” and we can formulate that in a 
believing process “babs” do not “exist” as single 
“monades” but as composite “bab-configura- 
tions”. Specifically, “babs” include physical at- 
tributes such as colour and form and personal 
attributes such as subjective meaning and rele- 
vance. In fact, “babs” represent pieces of 
knowledge with emotional loadings which are 
assembled into coherent knowledge constructs, 
the so-called stabilized “bab-configurations”. 
2.2.3 Characteristics of a bab 
Owing to the mental function of attribution we 
postulate four different characteristics of a 
“bab”: 
• The propositional content: a “bab” can be 
described as a proposition as for example: “I 
see something red” or “I fell something 
sharp”. The proposition becomes explicit by 
statements such as: “I see this ball to be red” 
or “I feel this knife to be sharp”. 
• The emotional moment: For example, a red 
light may be perceived as beautiful, warm or 
attractive, whilst a sharp item may be un- 
pleasant, harmful and, thus, frightening. 
Note, that the term “bab” comprises the sub- 
liminal emotional moment in addition to the 
propositional content. When this infor- 
mation is expressed verbally, the “bab” will 
reach explicit awareness both in the speak- 
ing and the listening subject. 
• The sense of mightiness: The perspective of 
a subject on a “bab” is not limited to the va- 
lence of an emotion but also includes the in- 
tensity of the emotion which is reflected by 
the “sense of mightiness”. Thus, this scaling 
of an emotion as strong or weak is inherent 
in the proposition of a “bab”. 
• The sense of certainty: this characteristic re- 
flects the conviction of an individual that a 
“bab” reflects the property of an object or 
event. The same proposition of a bab can 
have a high degree of certainty while for oth- 
ers it is uncertain. For instance, “I see some- 
thing red” or “I see something sharp” has a 
high degree of certainty in daylight but a low 
degree of certainty in faint light. 
The probabilistic assignment of attributes to an 
object or event constitutes a believing process. 
Due to the Converter function, the actual “bab- 
configuration” determines the concrete action 
an individual is intending to generate. As many 
stimuli do not reach our consciousness, we have 
to accommodate also the subliminal aspect 
(Teske 2007) in the credition model. For a bab 
which remains subconsciously the artificial term 








“blob” was introduced. In this case we should 
speak of a “bab-blob-configuration” rather than 
of a “bab-configuration”. We suggest that ef- 
fects of placebo or nocebo (Myers et al 1987, 
Benedetti et al 2006, Jensen et al 2012) are 
prominent examples for accounting for such a 
believing process. 
 
3. Human brain function underly- 
ing believing 
The processes of believing are understood to oc- 
cur in religious and secular contexts (Angel 
2013a). Note, that the concept of “creditions” is 
not limited to “religion” but extends to “religios- 
ity” in the domain of the individual. Beyond this 
immediate implication, the notion of creditions 
has opened a novel perspective on the role of 
belief systems as it highlights the process char- 
acter of believing in general. Quite different 
from religion, creditions are bare of ritual be- 
haviour and do not require myths. Moreover, 
owing to the processes character, belief systems 
can be conceived as differentially specified men- 
tal functions that are implemented in the hu- 
man brain. This provides the springboard that 
belief systems or creditions can be shared, dis- 
cussed and even reinforced in interpersonal in- 
tercourse and even in public (Runehov & Angel 
2013). 
 
3.1 Believing and the meaning-making 
process of the self 
 
Humans are exposed to a constantly changing 
complex physical, social and cultural environ- 
ment. From moment to moment information is 
being processed in terms of sensory quality and 
intensity by the modality specific sensory brain 
areas. This bottom-up process might be inter- 
preted within a framework of the “self” – a con- 
cept which was vigorously brought up in philo- 
sophical reflections since the time of   Illumina- 
 
tion (Thiel 2014). Moreover it can be under- 
stood as expression of a multi-layered notion of 
the human “self” (Sugiura 2011, Sugiura 2013) 
leads to probabilistic internal representations of 
the physical, social and cultural environment. 
Notably, there is a highly interwoven interaction 
of explorative movement generation and object 
perception (Roland & Mortensen 1987, Jean- 
nerod 1995, Binkofski et al. 2001). These fuzzy 
representations typically constitute personal 
knowledge that can be object of investigation 
and potential verification. However, the mental 
representations of a person may not be accessi- 
ble for scientific exploration and are, thus, not 
provable. Then, they constitute personal beliefs 
as can be found with high prevalence in socie- 
ties (Pechey & Halligan 2012). Importantly, the 
sensory information about objects and events in 
the complex outside world which humans are 
exposed to is immediately also evaluated in 
terms of personal meaning and relevance (Seitz 
& Angel 2014). The integration of the formal 
cognitive perspective about the outer world 
with the subjective emotional perspective 
about the inner world involves the assembly of 
many bits of information in the so-called Enclo- 
sure function of creditions (see above). Moreo- 
ver, the valuation process involves the focussing 
of attention to the incoming information in a 
bottom-up fashion and forms our probabilistic 
accounts or beliefs about the event observed in 
the outside world (Wiese et al. 2014). The com- 
parison with previously acquired knowledge 
during infancy and growing up allows for the 
top-down attribution of the personal affective 
loading to the new information using categories 
such as aversiveness, dangerousness, pleasant- 
ness or utility as well as novelty, certainty and 
mightiness (Figure 3). Note, that these mental 
processes cannot be reduced just to the func- 
tioning brain but are integral to and brought 
about by the action of the brain within the hu- 
man body (Fuchs & Schlimme 2009). 














Figure 3: Mental operations affording the rapid flow of information in the perception-action-valuation model (© 
Seitz, adapted from Seitz et al. 2009). 
 
 
The mental processes of object perception and 
evaluation are fast taking place within less than 
30 ms and, thus, do not necessarily lead to con- 
scious awareness (Bar et al. 2006, Smith 2011, 
van Gaal et al. 2012). Particularly in social inter- 
actions that typically span over seconds to 
minutes, the perceived events are set into a for- 
mal cognitive as well as subjective emotional 
perspective (Bird and Viding 2014). Critical for 
this top-down valuation process which involves 
a widespread cortico-subcortical network is the 
participation of the medial frontal cortex (Seitz 
et al 2009). New insights in empathic processing 
in the human brain and a new understanding of 
the role of the mirror neuron system (Keysers & 
Gazzola 2010, Bird & Viding 2014) are suited to 
bring onto the floor both the possibility and the 
need to optimize our emotional interactions 
which are only partly based on contents and 
propositions. Moreover, functional imaging has 
shown that processing of emotions and cogni- 
tions is partly overlapping in the lateral prefron- 
tal cortex (Gray et al. 2002, Prochnow et al. 
2014). Repetitive experience of the same ob- 
jects or events in the environment has a stabiliz- 
ing function of the cognitive-emotional repre- 
sentations such as familiarity promotes learning 
and has been shown to increase the trustwor- 
thiness of the information (Chang et al. 2010, 
Henkel & Mattson 2011). These findings support 
the notion that believing represents normal 
brain function. 
 
3.2 Believing and the Perception-Action- 
Value Triad 
The probabilistic mental representations or be- 
liefs can be used by the individual in a prospec- 
tive fashion to generate and initiate subsequent 
actions and to make predictions about the pos- 
sible reward and costs of performing them and, 
above that, how to optimize behaviour (Friston 
 
 






2010). Again, the motor responses to a stimulus 
are extremely fast occurring with latencies as 
short as 200 to 400 ms (Mirabella et al. 2006, 
Chen et al. 2010). Thus, the space of possible ac- 
tions is focussed with the aim to select an ap- 
propriate action and to suppress inappropriate 
actions on the basis of personally relevant 
knowledge which is associated with the sense of 
agency of the acting subject. Intended proactive 
and reactive motor control was found to be pro- 
cessed in the supplementary motor area and the 
adjacent pre-SMA, which are the most dorsal 
portions of the medial frontal cortex (Seitz et al. 
2006, Chen et al. 2010, d’Acremont et al. 2013). 
In fact, subjects can rely their behavioural deci- 
sions on categories such as right or wrong, good 
or bad, pleasant or unpleasant. This pertains in 
general but is of immediate importance in per- 
sonal encounters when the first-person per- 
spective is to be aligned with the second-person 
perspective (Potthoff & Seitz 2015). While most 
of the personal decisions concerning the control 
of actions and adaptive behaviour are subcon- 
scious or intuitive (Kahnt et al. 2010), discrimi- 
nations performed of literal or numerical infor- 
mation require attentive awareness. There is ac- 
cumulating evidence in the literature that the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is specifically in- 
volved in performing such decisions (Niendam 
et al. 2012). In fact, the activations of the dorso- 
lateral prefrontal cortex dung decision pro- 
cesses have been found to be related to the ca- 
pacity of the working memory system and fluid 
intelligence scores which was found to correlate 
with the expression of gamma-activity (Roux et 
al. 2012, Federenko et 2013). Note, that the cog- 
nitive-emotional representations of external 
objects and events are essentially probabilistic 
exhibiting different degrees of subjective cer- 
tainty. Those which are accessible to objective 
verification constitute personal knowledge, 
while those that cannot be substantiated by ob- 
jective  exploration make  up  personal religious 
 
or secular beliefs. Accordingly, the psychophysi- 
cal processes underlying the formation of be- 
liefs, e.g. creditions, critically involve the inte- 
gration of formal cognitive accounts with sub- 
jective emotional loadings. 
The nature of believing processes has been elab- 
orated as an integrated model which was based 
on the perception-action-value triad and ap- 
plied to three hierarchical levels (Sugiura et al. 
2015). This model provides a new interdiscipli- 
nary scientific perspective such that the believ- 
ing process can be understood as an adaptive 
adjustment process involving the interference 
of the inner probabilistic estimates of the out- 
side world according to a personal valuation ma- 
trix. In fact, the self-organization dynamics in 
the perception-action-value triad predict the 
believing process to behave as a personal cogni- 
tive-emotional function. Due to the belief selec- 
tion, which is assumed to be equivalent to ac- 
tion selection, it is expected that the belief of an 
individual is congruent with the personal valua- 
tion processes. With respect to the ontogenetic 
development, infants begin to construct physi- 
cal-level belief representations by learning the 
associations of one’s motor act and feedback 
sensations, and its cost or reward values. At the 
next stage of development the environment 
constituted by family members and friends will 
shape the interpersonal-level representations 
by associating the other’s reactions to one’s 
own behavior. The accumulation of the inter- 
personal-level representations enables young 
children and people, in general, to reflect upon 
the relationship between one’s own behavior in 
a specific social context and the social evalua- 
tion given to it. At the third level, the belief rep- 
resentations of individuals are likely to be bi- 
ased to beliefs that are held in the society or cul- 
ture the person lives in. The internal structure of 
the different belief representations explains the 
close   association   of   behavior   and  affective 
 
 






states in a nested hierarchy of belief contents at 
different levels of complexity. 
Accordingly, the psychophysiological processes 
underlying believing are intricately interwoven 
in the mental operations of perception and con- 
trol of action. As advanced by Jeannerod (1995) 
actions are generated as mental motor images 
(ideation) that reflect the temporal and kinaes- 
thetic characteristics of real actions being pro- 
cessed in the same brain areas. Conversely, ac- 
tions are tuned for optimal sensory exploration 
affording comprehension of the objects or 
events. We suggest that the processes de- 
scribed here represent fundamental human 
brain functions integrating cognitive and emo- 
tional perspective taking including personal con- 
siderations of secular and non-secular tran- 
scendence. Myth, ritual actions and the feeling 
of transcendence have been hypothesized to be 
key elements of religions (Schnell 2003). They 
are supplemented by the notion of creativity, al- 
mightiness and truth that have been attributed 
to deities or God (Fischbeck 2005). Thus, the 
framework of the processes of believing pro- 
vides a springboard for interdisciplinary explora- 
tion and hypothesis testing in terms of human 
brain physiology but also in pathological states 
in patients with neuropsychiatric diseases. Fur- 
thermore, it opens new paths of discussions on 
a wide range of traditional philosophical topics 
such as the relation of belief and faith, or of be- 
lief and knowledge. 
 
4. Credition as a (religion-free) 
base for understanding religions 
4.1 For credition there is no need of refer- 
ring to a religion 
Creditions can be conceived as a human ability 
which is employed by everybody uncountable 
times a day. The process of believing can inte- 
grate babs which are related to  transcendence 
 
and others which do not have an of such a rela- 
tion. In a single bab-blob configuration “pro- 
fane” and “transcendent” babs may be assem- 
bled. 
Regarding religion(s) the “sense of mightiness” 
(as an emotional value) and “the sense of cer- 
tainty” (as a personal conviction) becomes most 
influential. What some people experience as to- 
tally “certain” other may denote as highly am- 
biguous or untenable. Many people, for in- 
stance, entertain the idea or “bab-blob-configu- 
ration” that science (at least theoretically) can 
prove everything – they are probably ready to 
believe in scientific proofs. In contrast, others 
have the “bab-blob-configuration” that science 
always will produce – if at all – only preliminary 
knowledge. Accordingly, they probably are 
sceptic towards any scientific argument or posi- 
tion. In the same way some people may inte- 
grate a bab with a transcendent content into 
their “bab-blob-configurations” while others 
will not. 
One of the differences of profane and trans- 
cendent “bab-configurations” is their subjec- 
tively attributed degree of certainty. The indi- 
vidually accepted/attributed degree of certainty 
is only partly described by the concept of ration- 
ality. Even more, the notion of rationality (as a 
noun related concept) is sometimes misleading 
as it presumes a certain valuation process as 
“normal” or “logic”. This aspect may be the 
background of a recent development in the 
Western scientific world: the continuously in- 
creasing “belief” in paranormal phenomena. To 
phrase the relation between religious and pro- 
fane belief in a metaphoric way: “belief” does 
not mark the border between “religious” and 
“profane”. Rather, the border between both ori- 










On a more general level, many other aspects are 
touched by the credition project: for instance it 
pertains to the question of probability, the con- 
cept of utilitarianism, the understanding of 
truth or will, as well as the issue of personal suc- 
cess and satisfaction with life (Welzel & Ingle- 
hart 2010). Importantly, the concept of credi- 
tions provides openness to the philosophical 
tradition of process thinking and to the crucial 
question of the relation of being and becoming. 
This will be highlighted below. And it seems to 
underpin – from an innovative standpoint – the 
idea that there is a narrow connection between 
“religion and meaning” (Park 2005) on the one 
hand and – partly similarly – “atheism and 
meaning” on the other hand (Schnell & Keenan 
2011). Thus, the model of credition might give 
further impulses for the future of psychology of 
religion and spirituality (Paloutzian & Park 
2013). 
 
4.2 Credition-based understanding of re- 
ligious denominations and the Chris- 
tian ecumenical dialogue 
The claim to represent the (true) belief led in 
course of the history of the Christian church(es) 
to the development of a sophisticated “dog- 
matic” system (Theobald 2007). Along with the 
councils of the early centuries different 
“churches” came up and led to the big schism of 
the Church in 1054 which divided Christianity in 
a Western and an Eastern sphere (Baum & Win- 
kler   2003,   McGuckin   2010,   Nichols     2010, 
Siecienski 2010, Winkler 2013). Later, the 
Protestant reformation in the 16th century 
(D`Aubign 2010) which had a tremendous influ- 
ence in different countries in Europe was one of 
the most eminent starting points to bring up fur- 
ther denominations. Only, in the second half of 
the 20th century the idea of reconciliation, dia- 
logue and friendship between the Churches of 
Europe was promoted. To support this intention 
in 1959 the “Conference of European Churches” 
 
(CEC) was founded which encompasses more 
than 100 member churches 
(http://www.ceceurope.org/) . A major project 
was the production of the Charta Oecumenica 
of Europe's churches which was signed in Stras- 
bourg in 2001. Even within the theological facul- 
ties in Europe a network of cooperation was 
spurred, the so called Graz Process (http://graz- 
process.uni-graz.at/) to improve the under- 
standing and to work on overcoming the differ- 
ences. 
Expressed in terms of the model of credition: 
the separation can also be understood as a con- 
sequence of different “bab-blob configurations” 
with different emotional loadings of the differ- 
ent babs. If we are ready to analyse the history 
of churches under this aspect, we can see that 
the traditional ecumenical issues can be formu- 
lated within the framework of credition. On the 
one hand we are able to find out (of course not 
in the sense of “historism” but only in a histori- 
cally hypothetical sense) the prevailing “bab- 
blob-configurations” of the former actors [simi- 
larly to a palaeopathological analysis of histori- 
cal persons]. One the other hand the model of 
credition can be a helpful new tool of communi- 
cation which puts the anthropological processes 
of believing of the actual representatives of the 
ecumenical dialogue into the centre of interest 
rather than the dogmatic “positions”. Thus, it 
will be possible to analyse and to compare de- 
nominational positions of former and actual ac- 
tors as different “bab-blob configurations” with 
different emotional meanings and different de- 
grees of certainty. NB: It has to be discussed 
whether such an approach can be used to un- 
derstand “denominational” differences in other 
religions (for instance Sunna and Shia; Orthodox 
and Liberal Judaism and so on). 
 
 






4.3 Credition-based understanding of re- 
ligion(s) and the interreligious dia- 
logue 
Belief is not in the same way relevant for all re- 
ligions and in religions there are different atti- 
tudes towards “belief”. Alike, belief is not the 
only characteristic of religions and it is not suffi- 
cient when trying to understand all religious ex- 
periences (as for instance mystical experiences) 
under the perspective of belief. Thus, before 
any attempt to relate the model of credition to 
the interreligious dialogue, a profound semantic 
analysis of the terms and notions of “belief” has 
to be undertaken. This cannot be undertaken in 
the context of this presentation. We only can 




In Christianity the question of belief plays a 
more crucial role and belief is a fundamental 
term for understanding any religious articula- 
tion or self-articulation. In the tradition of Saint 
Paul who emphasized the role of belief (Aune 
2013; Marguerat 2013). In Christianity belief be- 
came a term of self-expression in a such over- 
whelming manner that theologians have enti- 
tled their books as an Introduction into Believ- 
ing, though they present an introduction into 




For Judaism the significance of “belief” is some- 
how less central as for Christianity, because the 
question of how to act gains a prevailing inter- 
est. To understand the Jewish notion of “belief” 
we have to be aware that there are different tra- 
ditions in an historical as well as in a contempo- 
rary sense. For instance, it might be difficult to 
define the notion of “belief” in the Hebrew writ- 
ten texts in the Old Testament because it is not 
expressively interested in the anthropological 
base of thinking (Janowski & Wolff 2010). It    is 
 
mainly in the Greek written parts of the Old Tes- 
tament that reflections of the notion and the 
role of belief play a major role (Proverbs 12,2; 
16,26; Judith 14,10). The Hebrew root of the 
word which has the most analogy to the Greek 
influenced concept of belief is “aman” which 
might be understood as “being confident” 
(Hieke 2009). 
 
4.3.3 Islamic Tradition: 
In the Islamic tradition the root of the term 
Īmān’ has the connotations ‘being secure, trust- 
ing in, turning to’; whence: ‘good faith, sincer- 
ity`(amana), then ‘fidelity, loyality´ (amāna), and 
thus the idea of ‘protection granted” (amān). 
The forth form (amāna) has the double meaning 
of ‘to believe, to give one`s faith’ and (with bi) 
“to protect, to place in safety”. The root ‘mn is 
one of the most frequently found in the vocab- 
ulary of the Kur’ān, where Īmān means 
sometines the act and sometime the content of 
faith, sometime both together.” (Gardet, 1978, 
1170). Of course it should be mentioned that 
there is vigorous and long way of interpreting 




It should be emphasized that credition denotes 
a theoretical concept rather than a real entity of 
the physical world. In fact, credition may be con- 
sidered as comparable to the concepts of „cog- 
nition“ and „emotion“ which at the turn of the 
nineteenth century were developed as central 
topics in psychology. In particular, William 
James (1890) defined a set of mental abilities 
and processes that constitute cognition render- 
ing it accessible to empirical study. Similarly, the 
concept of credition is pertinent for interdisci- 
plinary discussions of how to define an episte- 
mology of credition, the underlying theoretical 










Concepts of “belief” have been discussed previ- 
ously in different fields of research like philoso- 
phy or psychology of religion. However, there is 
no generally accepted definition which concep- 
tualizes believing with respect to its psychologi- 
cal properties. In fact, due to its highly complex 
character the issue of “believing” (i.e. as pro- 
cess) is scientifically orphan. In consequence, 
there is no a-priori given theoretical base which 
could serve as a starting point for carving out 
the concept of credition. Neither exists a genu- 
ine scientific base, which comprises all the dif- 
ferent research approaches concerning “belief” 
as “processes of believing”. 
However, if one accepts the concept of credition 
in a heuristic sense as granted, it will open the 
floor for a diversified discourse of how to relate 
empirical data to this model. But most likely, the 
outcome will depend on the given scientific dis- 
cipline such as molecular biology, neuro-anat- 
omy, sociology of religion, cognitive science, or 
in other fields. 
Owing to this multi-facetted situation, we pro- 
pose that the concept of credition has primarily 
a heuristic scope. In its relation to neuroscience 
it is suited to push the question of how believing 
processes are organized in the human brain. 
Though there is some first evidence that human 
brain function underpins the believing process, 
it has to be stressed that beliefs and believing 
are just starting to become possible targets for 
neuroscientific research. Moreover, we propose 
here that a number of cognitive processes are 
operative for the psychological act of believing. 
Thereby, we liberate the process of believing 
from metaphysical connotations, though the 
believing process might be one of the anthropo- 
logical bases for religious experiences. If the 
premise is accepted that believing is a physio- 
logical process of the human brain, “believing” 
becomes potentially accessible for neuroscien- 
tific investigations. 
6. Conclusions 
Under these considerations it might be fruitful 
to understand the believing process in the sense 
of the credition model and to discuss the possi- 
ble relations of the credition model to the dif- 
ferent notions of “belief/faith/believing” in the 
named religions. Taking into account the above 
mentioned neuro-scientific insights into the 
profound interdependence of emotion and cog- 
nition a new culture of appreciation may be es- 
tablished which provide means to keep cogni- 
tive and emotional impulses in balance. This in- 
tention could be supported by implementing 
the model of credition as a communication tool 
for a better understanding of the interaction of 
humans belonging to different cultures and to 
different religions. This innovative perspective 
may also influence our discussions of blasphemy 
and tolerance. It might be a fruitful enterprise to 
discuss different religious attitudes by referring 
to those non-religious possibilities which are 
given by the concept of creditions that provide 
an integration of cognitive and emotional pro- 
cesses of humans. Moreover, theoretical im- 
pulses taking into account the different anthro- 
pological starting-points may be expected to im- 
prove the model of credition and, thereby, ren- 
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